



FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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UNSOLVED PROBLEMS CHALLENGE BRITAIN'S LABOR PARTY

THE results of the British elections, announced on July 25, prove to have been a surprising and overwhelming victory for the Labor party. Although twice before in the inter-war period Labor spokesmen have directed His Majesty's Government, never before has the Labor party held an absolute majority in Parliament. In the first general election since 1935, the voters on July 5 conclusively repudiated Conservative party or coalition rule so characteristic of government in Britain during the past generation. In doing so Britain has also turned from the recent dynamic war leadership of Winston Churchill, although all observers attest to his continued personal popularity. The new Prime Minister, Clement R. Attlee, before his return on July 27 to Potsdam to take his place among the Big Three, announced the core of his cabinet in which Ernest Bevin will hold the post of Foreign Secretary. Herbert Morrison became Lord President of the Council and will act as leader of the House of Commons in this capacity. Hugh Dalton took over the Treasury post as Chancellor of the Exchequer, while Sir Stafford Cripps was designated as President of the Board of Trade.

LABOR'S PROGRAM AND POWER. Speculation with respect to the domestic and foreign repercussions of Labor's victory will continue well beyond August 15, the date set for the opening of the new Parliament and the speech from the Crown which will be prepared by the Labor Ministers. Although the King's speech can be expected to chart in broad terms the aims of the new government, many months may elapse before definite legislation is introduced in the Commons indicating the course Britain will pursue, particularly in internal reforms. The main question asked by Americans is whether the Labor party will implement the many socialist aims with which it has been so long identified. Its program of adequate housing, greater social security, revival of

export trade, and full employment differs little from the stated aims of the Conservative party. But Labor's long-term plans to nationalize the mines, inland transport and other public utilities, certain heavy industries like steel, and the Bank of England mark the socialist character of the new government.

Yet the British Laborites can not be called doctrinaire theorists. Nor are the Prime Minister and some of his prominent followers extreme socialists. Moreover, it is agreed that the mandate of the new government also includes the votes of large sections of the middle class who have not heretofore been identified with the Labor party. Many of the most able new leaders represent the trade union movement in the party, historically its most numerous as well as its more conservative element. It is to be noted, however, that of all important British parties Labor makes the least distinction between its Parliamentary Party and the National Party. For Laborites—whether in Parliament or not—are bound by the rather rigid discipline imposed by the party's constitution. For this reason the more articulate and radical exponents like Harold J. Laski, who is at present Chairman of the Executive Committee of the National Labor Party, carry some weight in Parliamentary circles.

Unlike the situation in 1924 or 1929, when Labor was in power with J. Ramsay MacDonald as Prime Minister, the new government will be under no obligation to defer to lesser liberal parties for adequate support. Britain may indeed face a return to full two-party government rather than consecutive coalitions made up of many disparate elements. In addition, the Labor cabinet brings to power men of long experience in Parliament who for the past five years have shared full responsibility for the conduct of the war government. Under the new mandate given by the electorate, the Labor party will doubtless be

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able to abandon much of its former cautiousness in tackling the reforms it has been urging.

LABOR LOOKS ABROAD. But irrespective of party differences, both Britain's internal problems and its foreign position will remain relatively constant. All observers agree that trade expansion remains Britain's most urgent task. The crucial need to revive and materially expand export trade, however, will prove no easier for the Labor party than it would have been for the Conservatives. Yet full employment, increased social welfare benefits, educational advances, health improvement and housing all depend on the reconstruction of British foreign trade. Labor has contended that nationalization of the country's basic industries and services would best aid this program of internal reforms. But neither the party nor individual Laborites have urged any drastic change in Britain's foreign economic policy.

Britain under a Labor government must hope not only to reconstruct its domestic industries; it must also immediately seek an improvement in its foreign trade position. For this reason it is expected that the new government will energetically maintain Empire-Commonwealth relationships. In India the Labor party may adopt a more aggressive approach in fostering Indian self-government since the Simla conference between the Indian Nationalists and the

Viceroy, Lord Wavell, broke down on July 14. But in the past the Labor party has not differed sharply from the Conservatives on India, and it is questionable whether the new government will favor a drastic readjustment of Britain's economic ties with India.

Britain may also find that the attitude of the United States toward the Labor party's plans for nationalization will hamper the achievement of British economic aims abroad. Press reports indicate that certain American business interests are fearful lest aid to Britain assist in subsidizing wholesale nationalization abroad. Yet Britain must necessarily remain dependent on United States economic assistance—at least during the reconversion period—irrespective of hesitancy or fear in this country about the prospects of socialization by Labor. If Britain's problems remain unchanged, however, so does the necessity for Anglo-American cooperation in economic relations. Only by jointly attacking the problem of expanding trade, increasing productivity, and assuring full employment in the world's two most highly developed industrial centers can both Britain and the United States tackle the urgent tasks of domestic reconstruction under conditions of international economic and political stability.

GRANT S. MCCLELLAN

U.S. INTEREST REQUIRES COOPERATION WITH ATTLEE GOVERNMENT

The Senate's ratification of the United Nations Charter on July 28 by an overwhelming majority of 89 to 2, and the election of the Labor party in Britain on July 5 by a sweeping vote that surprised both its friends and foes, should have a strongly stabilizing influence on Europe at a moment when that war-torn continent faces a grim winter that could all too easily become a season of dangerous discontent. By ratifying the Charter promptly, and with practically no dissent, the Senate has sought to give incontrovertible evidence that this country is determined not to return to a policy of isolation from the rest of the world, and is ready to assume its share of responsibility for the prevention and suppression of aggression.

RATIFICATION OF CHARTER ONLY FIRST STEP. Even more encouraging is the growing recognition that the Charter is but the first step toward the creation of an effective system of international security. True, some of the Senators who voted for the Charter expressed doubts about its efficacy, and others made mental reservations about its future implementation. But outstanding Senators, notably Ball of Minnesota, Republican, and Fulbright of Arkansas, Democrat, showed that they are fully aware of the fact that an attempt might be made to empty the Charter of all content by limiting the power of the American delegate on the Security

Council and the use of the military forces this country is pledged to place at the disposal of the United Nations organization. To avert this possibility President Truman, in a message from Potsdam on July 28, stated that he will submit the agreement specifying our military assistance to the United Nations organization for ratification by a majority of both Houses of Congress, not by a two-thirds majority of the Senate, where an attempt might have been made to whittle down this country's obligations under the Charter.

The Senate's action should assure other countries that they can count on continued and responsible participation by the United States in world affairs. The victory of the Labor party gives hope on another point—that a political transition portending important economic and social adjustments can be effected in orderly fashion by a democracy in spite of all the strain and suffering borne by the British during six years of war. Those to whom the phrase "Labor party" spells revolution and anarchy immediately jumped to the conclusion that the swing to Labor would encourage a Leftist trend in Europe. Actually, a trend to the Left has been increasingly noticeable all over the continent since 1939. The peoples of Europe, like the British, have shown a profound yearning for change, for something as different as possible from the conditions that favored, or at least

did not avert, their defeat. Such change can be carried out peacefully in the countries of Western Europe which, like Britain, have a long tradition of democracy and established machinery for the free expression of the popular will. But change may involve, and has already involved, violence and re- crimination in countries like some in Eastern Europe and the Balkans where conditions favorable to the growth of political democracy had not existed before 1939, or had barely begun to develop.

EUROPE NEEDS STRONG MIDDLE PARTIES.

The greatest danger to Europe's future was the pre- vailing feeling on the part of moderate groups in all countries that little or nothing in the way of change could be achieved by peaceful means, that to defeat reactionary elements which had shown affinities with Nazism and Fascism it would be necessary to turn to equally brutal and arbitrary elements on the ex- treme Left. Britain's bloodless transition will hearten the moderates—and Europe urgently needs strong middle groups which are eager to work for social progress, but unwilling to sacrifice human liberties in the process of achieving it. The experience of Russia, understandable in terms of that country's history of autocratic political rule and economic backwardness, was not a guide for most of Europe west of the Vistula. Yet in the absence of constructive leadership from Britain and the United States, which often seemed fearful of change and ready to support ele- ments regarded by the Europeans as reactionary for the sake of maintaining order, there was a growing danger that more and more Europeans, made des- perate by years of war, subjection to Nazi rule, and economic dislocation in the wake of liberation, would turn to Russia for guidance in the post-war period.

Political change, as Ernest Bevin, the new British Foreign Secretary once observed, does not alter geography, and the Laborites may not markedly dif- fer from the Conservatives on many issues of for-

eign policy affecting Britain's security. What will change is not the basic motif of British foreign pol- icy, but its mode of application, its tone. The Attlee government has an opportunity to provide a strong balance wheel in Europe—not against Russia, be- cause the Laborites are in a far better position than the Conservatives to seek genuine cooperation with Russia, free from both suspicion and sentimentality—but against the feeling of futility and despair that was spreading over the continent like a creeping paralysis, threatening to destroy the last vestiges of democracy.

It is of the utmost importance that the American people should understand this situation, and should not, through uninformed fear of what the Labor gov- ernment may do to private enterprise, range the United States against Britain on the major issues of our times. We must remember that such feeble ef- forts as were made by the countries of Europe be- fore 1939 to dam the rising tide of Nazism were balked again and again by fear in London that "so- cialism," as typified by the moderate Blum govern- ment in France, might prove a threat to Britain. Dis- astrous as this attitude proved for Europe, it also proved disastrous for Britain until, in the dark days of Dunkerque, the British, by sharing the sufferings of the continent, recovered the sympathy of their European neighbors. Had a Conservative government been returned by a large majority, Britain might have drifted farther and farther apart from Europe. The Labor party, which shares the aspirations of mod- erate Europeans for social progress based on personal freedom, now has a chance to recapture for Britain the position of leadership it enjoyed in the nineteenth century as the proponent of political democracy and the defender of human liberties.

VERA M. DEAN

CORRECTION

The Foreign Policy Association is very happy to correct an error that inadvertently occurred in the Washington News Letter published in the *Foreign Policy Bulletin* of July 6, 1945. In that letter Blair Bolles stated that "Foreign Service examinations would be given to 400 members of the armed ser- vices." The correct information is that, in coopera- tion with the War and Navy Departments, the De- partment of State is holding an examination on No- vember 19 and 20 to recruit approximately 400 For- eign Service officers, unclassified, from the armed services.

JUST PUBLISHED—

ROOSEVELT'S FOREIGN POLICY

by Blair Bolles

25c

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
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Washington News Letter



SOFT PEACE ADVOCATES ENCOURAGE JAPAN TO FIGHT ON

Their hopes for the return of peace aroused by the intensive bombing raids and naval shellings to which the allied forces are subjecting Japan, the American people today are tempted to hurry the war to its conclusion by steps which in reality can only prolong it.

An ever-growing number of American journalists and political spokesmen have been urging since early in May that the Allies announce a surrender policy for Japan based on some consideration besides unconditional surrender. Senator Warren Magnuson, Democrat, of Washington, told the Senate on July 24 that such appeals serve only to encourage the enemy to fight on in the hope of obtaining better terms. President Truman on July 26 accepted in part the argument of the advocates of modified surrender policy. With Winston Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek he issued to Japan an "ultimatum" which, while retaining the unconditional surrender formula, offered in vague words a set of terms for post-capitulation treatment far easier than those projected for Germany. The Japanese government at once demonstrated the soundness of Magnuson's prediction by rejecting the ultimatum.

JAPAN FACES THE CRISIS. The Japanese government has exploited the movement in this country for modification of unconditional surrender to stiffen popular resistance. Japanese propagandists are taking advantage of every possible weak point in this country's international relations. They stress American uncertainty with respect to Russia's intentions in Asia and advise the Chinese government to doubt the aims of the United States.

At the same time, the Japanese government is preparing the population for a serious military test with the Allies in the home islands. The Tokyo newspaper *Asahi* on July 25 warned that a "gigantic offensive" against the islands "has now entered upon its most decisive stage." On the same day General Jiro Minami, president of the totalitarian party, the Political Association of Great Japan, predicted that "further difficulties" lie ahead for the Japanese in the form of "intensified raids and the strain of living conditions." "The Japanese people are different from the German nation," Prime Minister Suzuki is quoted as saying by *Asahi*. "When the Japanese fight with their backs to the wall, they will most assuredly display tremendous power. . . . When the worst comes to the worst, they will show their true mettle."

The Japanese, nevertheless, permit signs of war-weariness and apathy to enter their published and broadcast reports. Takeo Tada, Naval Minister, said on July 19: "Among the people it is regrettable that there are some who, discouraged by the real facts of this fierce war, become resigned to an attitude of aimless and destructive disinterest and abandonment, or those who are carried off by an impatient frame of mind, neglect their duties and become idle and resentful." The unsatisfactory food situation contributes to this attitude. The ration of staple food-stuffs was cut 10 per cent for the summer months. The Japanese Board of Technology is trying to popularize the consumption of acorns, whose "nourishment is equivalent to whole rice," according to the Japanese radio. Inflation now threatens further to shake the people's support of the war.

U.S. PREPARES FOR THE FINISH. Although the Truman-Churchill-Chiang ultimatum can be read as an invitation to the Japanese people to put pressure on their leaders, the military campaign-planning of the United States assumes that civilian discontent will not cause the Japanese resistance to collapse until it is obvious that the military situation is hopeless. That point has not yet been reached. The Japanese still have material for continuing the war in a large army and in a supply of aircraft which currently are being held back from the struggle. The mountainous terrain of the Japanese islands gives the enemy hope that an invasion will prove a difficult feat. But the overwhelming comparative strength of the Allied forces is certain to force Japan into an exhausted defeat unless advocates of soft surrender in this country weaken our military operations by a renewal of their campaign. To forestall such a development, President Truman would be wise, on his return from Potsdam, to explain not to the Japanese but to the American people the issues at stake in the Far Eastern war.

BLAIR BOLLES

China's Crisis, by Lawrence K. Rosinger (Research Associate on the Far East, Foreign Policy Association). New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1945. \$3.00

Believing that our historic friendship for China has been compounded of excessive sentimentality, Mr. Rosinger has sought to present a realistic study of the political forces at work in China, the economic crisis and the conflict between Chungking and the Communist régime in Yen-an. Mr. Rosinger contends that liberal reforms in China will contribute to closer cooperation in the Far East among all the great powers, Russia included.

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